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7

8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
9 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

10 CYNTHIA L. CZUCHAJ, a  
California resident; ANGELIQUE  
11 MUNDY, a Pennsylvania resident;  
BARBARA MCCONNELL, a  
12 Michigan resident; and PATRICIA  
CARTER, a New York resident,  
13 individually and on behalf of  
themselves and all others similarly  
14 situated,

15 Plaintiffs,

16 vs.

17 CONAIR CORPORATION, a  
Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1  
18 through 10, inclusive,

19 Defendants.

20 Case No.: 13-cv-1901 BEN (RBB)  
*Honorable Roger T. Benitez*

21 **DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO  
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE  
INADMISSIBLE, SPECULATIVE,  
UNFOUNDED EXPERT OPINION  
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S  
ENGINEERING EXPERT ROBERT A.  
CARNAHAN**

22  
23 Hearing Date: August 22, 2016  
24 Hearing Time: 10:30 a.m.  
25 Department: 5A  
26  
27 Complaint Filed: August 15, 2013  
28 First Amended Complaint Filed: December 17, 2013  
Second Amended Complaint Filed: June 2, 2014  
Trial Date: September 13, 2016

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1                   **TO THIS HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR**  
2                   **ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:**

3                   Defendant Conair Corporation herein opposes Plaintiffs' motion to exclude selected  
4                   opinions of Robert Carnahan.

5                   **I. INTRODUCTION.**

6                   Plaintiffs' efforts to exclude selected opinions of Conair's expert, Robert Carnahan  
7                   (of Exponent), misses the fundamental purpose of Mr. Carnahan's role as an expert witness  
8                   in this case. Mr. Carnahan's testimony will critique Plaintiffs' liability expert, Phil Van  
9                   Herle's (of 4x Laboratories) opinion, destructive testing methodology, and associated  
10                  conclusions. As such, he is not required, under the law, to offer a definitive alternative  
11                  cause of failure of any hair dryer. That is Plaintiffs' burden. Mr. Carnahan is allowed to  
12                  critique Plaintiffs' expert's opinions, including testimony about what is *not* the cause of  
13                  failure of any hair dryer. Mr. Carnahan was present during Plaintiffs' destructive testing  
14                  of ten hair dryers, received and analyzed samples taken and all of the raw data received  
15                  from the testing, then critiques 4x's methodology and reliability of Plaintiffs' expert's  
16                  conclusions. To do so, it is not a prerequisite that Mr. Carnahan offer a definitive alternative  
17                  theory of causation, nor is it a prerequisite that Mr. Carnahan conduct his own testing.

18                  Ultimately, it is Plaintiffs' burden to prove there is an underlying design defect with  
19                  the 259 hair dryer to support Plaintiffs' two theories of this case: (1) violation of the  
20                  California Song-Beverly Act; and (2) violation of the New York General Business Law  
21                  §349. Conair's expert may offer rebuttal testimony that calls into question Plaintiffs'  
22                  expert's methodology and opinions. Those opinions by Mr. Carnahan are based on sound  
23                  and reasoned analysis of the data and facts in this case. Plaintiffs' challenge to Mr.  
24                  Carnahan's opinions speaks to the *weight* of such testimony, which is to be determined by  
25                  the jury, not the *sufficiency* of his testimony, which is properly evaluated under FRE 702  
26                  and *Daubert* standards.

27                  If there is any question regarding the bases of Mr. Carnahan's opinions, Conair  
28                  requests that a 402 hearing be held to address these issues.

1           **II. MR. CARNAHAN'S OPINIONS ARE NOT SPECULATIVE.**

2           “Unless the expert's opinion is in the realm of mere speculation or guesswork, the  
 3 expert should be allowed to testify and should be subjected to cross-examination for the  
 4 jury's consideration. An expert's opinion should not be excluded as speculative unless it is  
 5 so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury.” *United States v.*  
 6 *17.69 Acres of Land*, 2004 WL 5632928, at \*1 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

7           The entire basis of the instant motion is reliant on Plaintiffs' selective semantics.  
 8 Plaintiffs pick and choose isolated portions of Mr. Carnahan's report and deposition  
 9 testimony to reach the assumption that because Mr. Carnahan used the terms “may” and  
 10 “may have” in *three* isolated sentences in his 83-page report, this renders his ultimate  
 11 opinions speculative and inadmissible. Mr. Carnahan does not use the word “may” in any  
 12 of his opinions. Plaintiffs' representative of Mr. Carnahan's testimony is taken out of  
 13 context and does not dilute Mr. Carnahan's ultimate opinions. Moreover, Plaintiffs'  
 14 arguments are also not in conformity with the law on this issue.

15           ***A. Mr. Carnahan Offered Specific and Definitive Ultimate Opinions  
 16           Regarding Observed Coil Failures.***

17           Conair retained Mr. Carnahan to critique Plaintiffs' expert's opinions, in part,  
 18 regarding the coil failure being a design defect as opposed to an isolated manufacturing  
 19 defect in Neumax manufactured hair dryers. In this regard, Mr. Carnahan intends to offer  
 20 the following opinions:

- 21           1. Neumax hair dryers with failed heater coils exhibit severe mica board wear.
- 22           2. Relatively minor mica board wear observed in the already heavily used  
                   Gutierrez (Sun Luen hair dryer does not support the contention by 4x  
                   Forensic that this unit would have experienced a coil-to-coil short circuit with  
                   continued use).
- 23           3. Relatively minor mica board wear observed in the Silver Plan (Ellington)  
                   hair dryer that was examined and tested indicates that the heater coil failed  
                   for reasons other than mica board wear and therefore did not fail for the same

1 reason as the Neumax heater coils. Examination of one hair dryer in [sic] not  
2 sufficient to draw conclusions of any sort regarding the population of Silver  
3 Plan hair dryers.

4 4. Hair dryer vibration testing performed by 4x Forensic should not be relied  
5 on due to the manner in which the accelerometer was attached to the hair  
6 dryers and due to the fact that the hair dryers were allowed to sit freely on a  
7 hard lab bench during testing.

8 5. Heater coil oscillation is related to acceleration of the mica board, among  
9 other things. 4x measured acceleration of the hair dryer housing, not the mica  
10 board

11 6. 4x hair dryer housing acceleration measurements with the hair dryers sitting  
12 loose on a table top do not represent normal use conditions.

13 7. Changes in hair dryer housing acceleration measured by 4x during dynamic  
14 testing were caused by rocking the hair dryer back and forth and have nothing  
15 to do with gyroscopic effects.

16 [Exhibits "A" at pp. 81-82 and "B" at p. 37].

17 ***B. Mr. Carnahan Offered Specific and Definitive Ultimate Opinions  
18 Regarding Observed Cord Failures.***

19 Mr. Carnahan offered the following definitive opinions regarding the alleged  
20 cord failures and critique of Plaintiffs' expert's opinion:

21 8. The Sun Luen (Gutierrez and Czuchaj) hair dryer power cord separations and  
22 Sun Luen (Wagenblast) power cord strand fractures were caused by abuse.

23 9. Examination and testing performed by 4x Forensic does not support their  
24 conclusion that Sun Luen hair dryer cord bushings are defective. Moreover,  
25 4xd has performed no performance testing or engineering analysis of the  
26 power cords or bushings.

1 10. The Sun Luen pre-July 2013 hair dryer equipped with a shorter strain relief  
 2 was tested in accordance with applicable standards and passed.

3 11. Customer abuse of power cords is a known issue and a concern for any  
 4 consumer product that uses an AC power cord. Customer abuse of power  
 5 cords is not specific to Conair Infiniti Pro hair dryers. No power cord can be  
 6 designed to last forever or to withstand all conditions.

7 12. 4x has performed no testing to relate their bushing curvature measurements  
 8 to line cord performance.

9 13. 4x did not propose a method to repair hair dryers supplied with allegedly  
 10 defective bushings.

11 14. There is no design defect in the line cord detection circuit due to the lack of  
 12 a third ground conductor or lack of fuse as asserted by 4x.

13 [Exhibits "A", pp. 81-82 and "B" at p. 37].

14 **C. Reliable and Certain Opinions Are Admissible.**

15 Mr. Carnahan's opinions are sufficiently reliable and certain. *Pyramid Technologies,*  
 16 *Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.*, 752 F.3d 807, 814–16 (9th Cir. 2014) (expert's opinion was  
 17 sufficiently relevant, reliable, and certain, to be admissible and the trial court erred by  
 18 excluding it). *Messick v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.*, 747 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2014)  
 19 (expert's opinion based on differential diagnosis was sufficiently relevant and reliable and  
 20 the court should not have excluded it, even though it failed to rule out all other possible  
 21 causes); *Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco*, 576 F.3d 938, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2009)  
 22 (expert's "suicide by cop" theory was sufficiently reliable under Daubert, even if the theory  
 23 could not be subject to testing and other experts might reach different conclusions); *Dukes*  
 24 *v. Wal-Mart, Inc.*, 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), *opinion withdrawn and superseded on*  
 25 *denial of reh'g*, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), *reh'g en banc granted*, 556 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.  
 26 2009), *reh'g en banc*, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), *cert. granted in part*, 131 S. Ct. 795  
 27 (2010), and *rev'd on other grounds*, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (expert testimony does not need  
 28 to rise to a quantifiable level of certainty in order to be reliable and admissible).

1       Other circuits also concur that exclusion of an expert related to causation is improper  
2 because it speaks to the *weight* of the testimony as opposed to the *sufficiency*. *Heller v.*  
3 *Shaw Industries, Inc.*, 167 F.3d 146, 156–57 (3d Cir. 1999) (expert did not need to rule out  
4 all other possibilities for the opinion to be valid) (note that the expert's opinion was properly  
5 excluded on other grounds); *Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc.*, 80 F.3d 777, 785–86,  
6 (3d Cir. 1996) (no error in allowing the defendants' expert to testify that a certain product  
7 was “a distinct possible cause” of the plaintiff's disease); *V & M Star Steel v. Centimark*  
8 *Corp.*, 678 F.3d 459, 466–68 (6th Cir. 2012) (expert's opinion was sufficiently relevant and  
9 sufficiently certain to be admissible. Any weaknesses impacted the weight and not the  
10 admissibility of the opinion and thus, the trial court erred by excluding it); *U.S. v. Bonds*,  
11 12 F.3d 540, 558 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Daubert requires only scientific validity for  
12 admissibility, not scientific precision.”); *U.S. v. Brady*, 595 F.2d 359, 362–63 (6th Cir.  
13 1979) (expert's lack of certainty in an opinion regarding hair comparison affected the  
14 weight of the opinion and not the admissibility of it); *Gayton v. McCoy*, 593 F.3d 610, 618–  
15 19 (7th Cir. 2010) (expert's opinion regarding causation was not required to be absolutely  
16 certain in order to be admissible and the trial court erred by excluding the opinion as  
17 unreliable on the basis that it did not rule out certain other possible causes); *Stutzman v.*  
18 *CRST, Inc.*, 997 F.2d 291, 295–96 (7th Cir. 1993) (any lack of certainty in the opinions of  
19 experts affected the weight and not the admissibility of their opinions and the trial court  
20 did not abuse its discretion by admitting the opinions); *Tedder v. American Railcar*  
21 *Industries, Inc.*, 739 F.3d 1104, 1109–10 (8th Cir. 2014) (expert's testimony regarding  
22 causation was sufficiently certain for the jury to consider it); *Ramirez v. E.I. DuPont de*  
23 *Nemours & Co.*, 579 Fed. Appx. 878, 880–83 (11th Cir. 2014) (doctor's testimony  
24 regarding lack of causation was sufficiently certain to be admissible).

25       There is nothing speculative about Mr. Carnahan's ultimate opinions. Just like  
26 Plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Carnahan examined and made observations regarding certain failed  
27 Neumax hair dryers. He also examined and made observations about Sun Luen and Silver  
28 Plan manufactured hair dryers. Based on these observations and measurements, he reached

1 the above conclusions. None of these opinions are based on guesswork. Rather, Mr.  
 2 Carnahan's opinions criticize Plaintiffs' expert's opinion that there is a coil design defect,  
 3 as opposed to a manufacturing defect. Mr. Carnahan's opinions are proper and well within  
 4 the scope of relevant, reliable expert opinion under *Daubert*.

5 ***D. Mr. Carnahan Does Not Have to Offer An Ultimate Opinion About What  
 6 Caused Certain Coil Failures.***

7 Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Carnahan's opinions should be excluded because he does  
 8 not provide an ultimate opinion as to why certain hair dryers failed. First, that is an  
 9 incorrect reading of Mr. Carnahan's report and deposition testimony. He does provide  
 10 such opinions. Second, as a matter of law, he does not have to reach any such conclusion.  
 11 "Lack of certainty is not, for a qualified expert, the same thing as guesswork. Expert opinion  
 12 testimony is relevant if the knowledge underlying it has a valid connection to the pertinent  
 13 inquiry. And it is reliable if the knowledge underlying it has a reliable basis in the  
 14 knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline." *Primiano v. Cook*, 598 F.3d 558,  
 15 565 (9th Cir. 2010), *as amended* (Apr. 27, 2010) (internal citation omitted)

16 The Ninth Circuit has similarly stressed that "it would be unreasonable to conclude  
 17 that the subject of scientific testimony must be 'known' to a certainty; arguably, there are  
 18 no certainties in science. *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786." *Messick v. Novartis  
 19 Pharm. Corp.*, 747 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014).

20 Here, Plaintiffs take issue with three isolated sentences of Mr. Carnahan's report.  
 21 These sentences are on pages 77 and 78 of Mr. Carnahan's report in a discussion wherein  
 22 Mr. Carnahan was specifically commenting the "September 16, 2015 4x Forensic Report."  
 23 [Exhibit "A."]

24 This portion of the report by Mr. Carnahan was dedicated to either agreeing to or  
 25 critiquing the report of Plaintiffs' expert. This section goes from pages 77 to 80. In this  
 26 section, Plaintiffs point to three sentences:

27 1. "The Silver Plan heater coil may have failed because it was loose. (p. 77,  
 28 ¶2, third sentence);

- 1 2. "Oscillation of the heater coils may result from motor and fan vibration and
- 2 possibly air flow through the nozzle (p. 77 ¶4);
- 3 3. "The Accelerometer, which is flat, is intended to be rigidly mounted to a flat
- 4 surface. Instead, it was non-rigidly mounted to the curved surface of the hair
- 5 dryer using zip-ties or tape. This may have allowed for additional vibration
- 6 between the accelerometer and hair dryer." (p. 78, ¶1)

7 [Exhibit "A."]

8 Contrary to Plaintiffs' word play, Mr. Carnahan's opinion regarding the heater coil  
 9 failures are not based on speculation, but rather were based on his observations regarding  
 10 comparative differences between the three failed Neumax hair dryers and the one failed  
 11 Silver Plan hair dryer. The single cited sentences regarding his analysis cannot be read in  
 12 a vacuum. Conair encourages this Court to read pages 77-80 of Mr. Carnahan's report so  
 13 that the context of the statements are clear.

14 Regardless, Mr. Carnahan's ultimate opinions (which are on pages 81-82 of his  
 15 report) are not based upon the three selected sentences, but rather upon the totality of his  
 16 82 page report. *See Exhibit "A."*

17 **1. Mr. Carnahan's Opinions Regarding the Silver Plan Heater Coil**  
 18 **and Potential Oscillations Are Based on Proper Foundation and**  
 19 **Are Not Speculative.**

20 Of the ten hair dryers that were observed by the experts, there was only one Silver  
 21 Plan manufactured hair dryer that had a failure. Plaintiff's expert Phil Van Herle concedes  
 22 that he only observed coil ejections in hair dryers manufactured by Neumax. He did not  
 23 observe any hair dryers that failed as a result of a coil ejection that were manufactured by  
 24 the other three hair dryer manufacturers: Sun Luen, Silver Plan or Yueli. [Deposition of  
 25 Van Herle as Exhibit "C" at 173:14-25 (Neumax only); 160:17-22 (he only observed one  
 26 Silver Plan with coil ejection), but at 150:12-21 (the only Silver Plan coil ejection was a  
 27 result of a human error, not design defect).]

28 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have attempted to use this one failed hair dryer as a catalyst

1 to expand the scope of the failures beyond the Neumax failed hair dryers.<sup>1</sup>

2 In regard to the one failed Silver Plan hair dryer, Mr. Carnahan observed: (1) The  
 3 Silver Plan hair dryer sustained a heater coil failure; and (2) the Silver Plan heater coil  
 4 failure does not appear related to the Neumax heater coil failures. Mr. Carnahan also states  
 5 that “The Silver Plan heater coil may have failed because it was loose.” [Exhibit “A” p.  
 6 77, ¶2.] However, this is just a summary of the information that Mr. Carnahan set forth  
 7 previously on pages 33-39 of his report wherein he opines: “The observed mica board wear  
 8 is not consistent with that observed in the Neumax hair dryers, and is not sufficient to have  
 9 allowed the heater coils to contact one another.” [Id at p. 33, ¶3.]

10 Mr. Carnahan’s ultimate opinion regarding this hair dryer is that “Relatively minor  
 11 mica board wear [was] observed in the one Silver Plan hair dryer . . . [and] the heater coil  
 12 failed for reasons other than mica board wear and therefore did not fail for the same reasons  
 13 as the Neumax heater coils.” [Id. at p. 81, at ¶7.] Mr. Carnahan continues: “Examination  
 14 of one hair dryer is not sufficient to draw conclusions of any sort regarding the population  
 15 of Silver Plan hair dryers.” [Id.]

16 This opinion is not unfounded or speculative. See *General Elec. Co. v. Joiner*, 522  
 17 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that in some cases a trial court “may conclude that there is  
 18 simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered”). Rather,  
 19 Mr. Carnahan’s opinions are based upon his observations and are well-reasoned.

20 **2. Mr. Carnahan Observed An Improper Testing Methodology  
 21 by Plaintiffs’ Expert.**

22 Plaintiffs’ next two complaints result from Mr. Carnahan’s criticism of Mr. Van  
 23 Herle’s collection of vibration measurements.

24 Mr. Carnahan explicitly observed and opined that the hair dryers were moving  
 25 during the vibration testing because Mr. Van Herle did not properly secure the testing

26 <sup>1</sup>/ Conair concedes that there was a manufacturing defect in a subset of Neumax hair dryers  
 27 which prompted the recall. Conair denies there is any design defect in regard to any of the hair  
 28 dryers. Further there is no evidence that there was a similar failure mode in any hair dryer  
 manufactured by Silver Plan, Sun Luen or Yueli. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs continue to argue that all  
 hair dryers are defective.

1 device to the hair dryer. More significantly, Mr. Van Herle later admits this error in his  
2 supplemental report. Mr. Van Herle then conducts the vibration testing again (this time  
3 outside the presence of Mr. Carnahan). During the deposition of Mr. Van Herle, it was  
4 discovered that he again performed the vibration testing incorrectly because he taped the  
5 device to the hair dryer instead of attaching it with screws. [Deposition of Van Herle at  
6 175:18-24 “. . . did you follow the instructions . . . ? “I did not . . . .”] [See Exhibit “C.”] Mr.  
7 Van Herle then prepared a second supplemental report and purportedly performed the  
8 vibration testing again for a third time. This issue is the subject of Conair’s motion to  
9 exclude Mr. Van Herle. [Docket No. 296.]

10 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs are attempting to restrict Mr. Carnahan from testifying about  
11 Mr. Van Herle’s improper data collection.

12 Mr. Carnahan critiques Mr. Van Herle’s first testing error by noting that the  
13 vibration testing was conducted while the dryers were sitting freely on a wooden table top.  
14 The hair dryers were moving while being tested *and would have been vibrating against the*  
15 *table top.*” [Exhibit “A” at p. 78, ¶1.] (emphasis added).

16 Ultimately, based on the above observations by Mr. Carnahan, he concludes: “Given  
17 uncertainty regarding the veracity of the acceleration measurements and the existence of  
18 only mild mica board wear in the Sun Luen (Gutierrez) hair dryer (and the Silver Plan hair  
19 dryer), we do not believe that 4x’s conclusion is based on sound engineering judgment.”  
20 [Id. at p. 78, ¶2.] Mr. Carnahan’s opinions are based on a sound foundation of his  
21 background and expertise, observations and critique of Plaintiffs’ expert’s methodology  
22 and findings. It would be improper to exclude this opinion.

23

24 **III. MR. CARNAHAN IS A REBUTTAL EXPERT AND IS PROPERLY**  
**ADDRESSING THE IMPROPRIETY OF PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S**  
**CONCLUSIONS.**

25 Plaintiffs are confused about their burden. Mr. Carnahan is not obligated to conduct  
26 independent testing in order to criticize Plaintiffs’ expert’s opinions. It is Plaintiffs’ burden  
27

1 to establish that underlying their New York false advertising claim and California implied  
 2 warranty claim, that there are two separate design defects for the coil and cord. Just because  
 3 Mr. Carnahan offered some alternative causes for the failure of a single Silver Plan hair  
 4 dryer with a coil failure does not render his ultimate opinions speculative that the observed  
 5 coil failures were not due to a design defect.

6 Mr. Carnahan's role is to rebut Plaintiffs' expert's testing methodologies and flaws  
 7 in how the expert reached his conclusions that there is a design defect with the 259 hair  
 8 dryer.<sup>2</sup> It is not Conair's burden to prove what the ultimate cause of certain failed hair  
 9 dryers was, only to dispute Plaintiffs' expert's basis and understanding of causation. Mr.  
 10 Carnahan does this based on his expertise, observations and critiques of Plaintiffs' expert's  
 11 methodology and findings in destructive testing.

12 **A. *Conair's Expert Is Entitled to Critique Plaintiffs' Expert's Methodology to***  
 13 ***Point Out the Flaws in the Expert's Conclusions.***

14 Plaintiffs do not cite any legal authority that a rebuttal expert must conduct testing  
 15 or otherwise face exclusion for "speculative" opinions. That is because this not the  
 16 standard regarding rebuttal opinions intended to critique an opposing expert's opinions.  
 17 "Expert opinions ... which assess or critique another expert's substantive testimony are  
 18 relevant." *Nature's Plus Nordic A/S v. Nat. Organics, Inc.*, 982 F.Supp.2d 237, 239  
 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Numerous courts have permitted experts to  
 20 testify at trial about the reliability of the opinions of opposing experts. *United States v.*  
 21 *Mitchell*, 365 F.3d 215, 247 (3d Cir.2004) (error to exclude testimony of qualified opposing  
 22 expert provided testimony meets criteria for admission under Rule 702); *United States v.*  
 23 *Velasquez*, 64 F.3d 844, 852 (3d Cir.1995) (error to exclude expert testimony that called  
 24 into doubt reliability and credibility of opposing expert's testimony); *Benedict v. United*  
 25 *States*, 822 F.2d 1426, 1429 (6th Cir.1987) (expert testimony which directly disproves  
 26 accuracy of opposing expert methodology and data is proper rebuttal); *Manchak v. N-Viro*

27 <sup>2/</sup> This is why the three sentences Plaintiffs claim are speculative are all contained in a  
 28 section entitled, "Review of September 15, 2015 4x Forensic Report," in Mr. Carnahan's Report.

1     *Energy Sys., Ltd.*, 876 F.Supp. 1123, 1133 (CD.Cal.1994) (rebuttal expert testimony  
 2 admitted to challenge validity of test relied on by opposing expert).

3     “Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, a rebuttal expert who critiques another expert's  
 4 theories or conclusions need not offer his own independent theories or conclusions.” *In*  
 5 *re Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liab. Litig.*, 2009 WL 1649773, at \*1 (D. Kan.  
 6 June 9, 2009) (“The expert reports of [defendant's] experts primarily critique the  
 7 methodology and scientific principles which plaintiffs' experts use to arrive at their  
 8 conclusions. Such evidence, which attacks the opposing expert's substantive testimony, is  
 9 proper rebuttal.”); *ROMAG Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.*, 2014 WL 1246554, at \*4 (D.  
 10 Conn. Mar. 24, 2014) (“Contrary to Defendants' argument, Armstrong's proposed  
 11 testimony regarding a consumer experiment is not incomplete. Armstrong does not propose  
 12 to testify regarding the hypothetical outcome of the proposed experiment. Rather, he  
 13 proposes to testify, based on his extensive experience in marketing and survey research as  
 14 to the flaws in Jay's survey, and how those flaws could have been corrected with a different  
 15 design. The Court concludes, based on Armstrong's extensive marketing experience, that  
 16 such rebuttal testimony is relevant, reliable, and would be helpful to the jury”).

17     ***B. Carnahan Is Not Obliged to Provide Absolute Alternatives in Critiquing***  
 18     ***Plaintiffs' Expert's Conclusion Regarding Causation.***

19     Not only is testing not a requirement, but a number of District Courts have held that  
 20 rebuttal expert witnesses may criticize other experts' theories and calculations without  
 21 offering alternatives. *See, e.g., Coquina Invs. v. Rothstein*, 2011 WL 4949191, at \*5  
 22 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 18, 2011) (“A rebuttal expert can testify as to the flaws that she believe[s]  
 23 are inherent in another expert's report that implicitly assumes or ignores certain facts.”)  
 24 (citation omitted); *Pandora Jewelers 1995, Inc.*, 2011 WL 2295269, at \*6 (admitting a  
 25 rebuttal expert who “merely provides other factors that [the plaintiff's expert] should have  
 26 considered in his report, based on her economics expertise,” explaining that “[h]ighlighting  
 27 such factors will be helpful for the jury to weigh the evidence presented at trial.”); *1st*  
 28 *Source Bank v. First Res. Fed. Credit Union*, 167 F.R.D. 61, 65 (N.D.Ind.1996) (allowing

1 a rebuttal expert witness to criticize the plaintiff's damages theories and calculations  
 2 without offering any alternatives); *Deutsch v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.*, 768 F.Supp.2d 420,  
 3 481 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (refusing to exclude rebuttal experts who focused on the reliability of  
 4 plaintiff's expert's conclusions).

5 Plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Carnahan should be excluded because for an alleged  
 6 failure to conduct any testing or to offer alternative causes is baseless. Mr. Carnahan is  
 7 properly being offered as a rebuttal witness to criticize Plaintiffs' expert's theories and  
 8 calculations and his opinions are based on a sound foundation of observing testing  
 9 performed by Plaintiffs' expert.

10

11 **IV. MR. CARNAHAN DID EXPRESS OPINIONS ON MATTERS**  
 12 **IDENTIFIED, AND IS ENTITLED TO CRITIQUE PLAINTIFFS'**  
 13 **EXPERT'S OPINIONS AND TESTING.**

14 Plaintiffs identify a list of topics for which they incorrectly identify that Mr.  
 15 Carnahan did not express any opinions. Plaintiffs' Motion is vague, ambiguous and  
 16 convoluted as to exactly what opinions they are seeking to exclude. [See, Motion, 9:17-  
 17 10:9.] From what Conair can decipher, contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, Mr. Carnahan  
 18 either expressed an opinion, or otherwise, is entitled to express an opinion as addressed  
 19 below.

20 **1. "Whether the materials specifications of the three editions of the**  
 21 **dryers are nearly identical."**  
 22 **3. "Whether there are any material differences in the materials used**  
 23 **to manufacture the Silver Plan, Sun Peun, and Neumax mica boards**  
 24 **and/or whether they experienced the same rate of wear"**

25 Mr. Carnahan was never actually asked if there were any material differences or  
 26 whether the specifications were nearly identical. There are 8 pages of deposition transcript  
 27 testimony of Plaintiffs' counsel requesting that Mr. Carnahan read and identify the product  
 28 specifications for three 259 hair dryer manufacturers, which he did. At most, Mr. Carnahan

1 was asked if he found any material differences between the Neumax, Silver Plan and Sun  
2 Luen *mica boards*. [Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit "2" at 47:5-23.] Mr. Carnahan was not  
3 asked his opinion, one way or the other about the whether the material specifications were  
4 nearly identical and whether it mattered.

5 Moreover, the product specification documents speak for themselves. It is unclear  
6 why an expert opinion is necessary on this topic, requiring scientific, technical or other  
7 specialized knowledge, so much as a reading comprehension.

8 Further, Plaintiffs' own expert cannot speak to whether the mica boards experienced  
9 the same rates of wear. Thus, if Mr. Carnahan is for any reason excluded from providing  
10 this opinion, Plaintiffs' expert, Van Herle, should also be excluded.

11 Accordingly, Mr. Carnahan should not be precluded from addressing these two  
12 topics regarding material specification differences.

13 **2. "The conduct of any FTIR, SEM or other material testing, or opinions  
14 on whether the polymer or metallic components of the three editions of  
15 the Subject Hair Dryer are made from nearly identical materials and/or  
16 any opinions based thereon."**

17 The term "conduct" is vague and ambiguous and it is not clear what Plaintiffs are  
18 referring to. It is not true that Mr. Carnahan did not express an opinion about the metallic  
19 components of the hair dryer. As indicated in his Report, Mr. Carnahan stated: "Review  
20 of 4x photomicrographs of these samples indicates that they all have similar microstructure  
21 and do not exhibit microstructural abnormalities." [Exhibit "A", p. 73, ¶1.]

22 Additionally, Mr. Carnahan testified that he reviewed the results of testing  
23 performed by 4x. Plaintiff's expert conducted very limited mica board testing from one  
24 hair dryer that was provided to Conair's expert. Thus, if Mr. Carnahan is excluded from  
25 testifying about this topic, Plaintiffs' expert should similarly be limited in his testimony at  
26 trial regarding material testing whether the mica boards are "made from nearly identical  
27 materials."

28 Moreover, the fact that Mr. Carnahan did not conduct his own material testing or

1 alternative analysis is not a basis to exclude his opinion on such matters. An expert is  
 2 entitled to criticize other experts' theories and testing without conducting their own testing.  
 3 *See Aviva Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Marketing, Inc.*, 829 F.Supp.2d 802, 834 (D.  
 4 Minn. 2011) ("[R]ebuttal expert witnesses may criticize other experts' theories and  
 5 calculations without offering alternatives."); *Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 537  
 6 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1324–25 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (holding that rebuttal expert could critique  
 7 opposing expert's survey based on his specialized knowledge and experience without  
 8 conducted his own tests or experiments); *ROMAG Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.*, 2014 WL  
 9 1246554, at \*4 (D. Conn. Mar. 24, 2014) (refusing to exclude expert proposing to testify  
 10 about flaws in opposing expert's survey research and how could be corrected).

11 Accordingly, because Mr. Carnahan did provide an opinion as to the composition  
 12 of certain component parts based on what was provided, he should not be excluded for a  
 13 claimed lack of opinion. Further, that he did not conduct his own testing is not a basis to  
 14 exclude his opinion on this topic.

15 **4. "The conduct of any testing on and/or any opinion on whether the new**  
 16 **cord design of the initial version of the Sun Leun [sic] edition of the**  
 17 **Subject Hair Dryer resulted in 'improved endurance' of its power cord."**

18 **5. "No opinion on whether the new cord design of the Sun Luen edition of**  
 19 **the Subject Hair Dryer improved the endurance of its power cords."**

21 Again, the term "conduct" is vague and ambiguous as to what Plaintiffs are seeking to  
 22 exclude Mr. Carnahan from testifying about. To the extent Plaintiffs seek to exclude Mr.  
 23 Carnahan from testifying about whether or not the 3 inch cord bushing "improved  
 24 endurance" of the power cord, Conair does not oppose this.

25 **6. "No opinion on Conair's purpose for the cord redesign of the Sun Leun**  
 26 **[sic] edition of the Subject Hair Dryer."**

28 The purpose of the cord redesign does not require expert testimony to the extent the

1 purpose is set forth in Conair's engineering documents. Mr. Carnahan was questioned  
2 about this during his deposition and he testified that the engineering report indicated that  
3 the purpose was for "improved endurance of cord flexing." Thus, the document speaks  
4 for itself and there is no basis of reason to exclude Mr. Carnahan from addressing the same.

5 **7. "No opinion on what caused the coils in the Ellington dryer to fail and  
6 separate."**

7 Mr. Carnahan does provide an opinion about what may have caused the Ellington  
8 coil to fail. He opines that the Silver Plan heater coil may have failed because it was loose,  
9 something Plaintiffs' expert similarly conceded and agrees may have caused the Ellington  
10 coil failure. Exhibit "C" at 160:17-22 (he only observed one Silver Plan with coil ejection).

11 Ultimately, Mr. Carnahan opines that "relatively minor mica board wear observed  
12 in the one Silver Plan (Ellington hair dryer that was examined and tested indicates that the  
13 heater coil failed for reasons other than mica board wear and therefore did not fail for the  
14 same reason as the Neumax heater coils." [Exhibit "A" at p. 81, ¶7.] Further, as an expert  
15 critiquing Plaintiffs' expert's conclusions about the cause of the Ellington hair dryer, Mr.  
16 Carnahan need not offer definitive alternative causes for the failure. *1st Source Bank v.*  
17 *First Res. Fed. Credit Union*, 167 F.R.D. 61, 65 (N.D.Ind.1996) (allowing a rebuttal expert  
18 witness to criticize the plaintiff's damages theories and calculations without offering any  
19 alternatives); *Deutsch v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.*, 768 F.Supp.2d 420, 481 (E.D.N.Y.2011)  
20 (refusing to exclude rebuttal experts who focused on the reliability of plaintiff's expert's  
21 conclusions).

22 Accordingly, there is no legitimate basis to exclude Mr. Carnahan's opinion on this  
23 the topic.

24 **8. "No vibration testing of the three editions of the Subject Hair Dryer,  
25 and/or any opinions based thereon"**

26 Plaintiffs are vague and ambiguous about what "three editions" of hair dryers they  
27 are claiming Mr. Carnahan should be excluded from opining about. Nevertheless, as  
28

1 addressed herein, it is not a prerequisite that Mr. Carnahan conduct vibration testing  
2 independently in order to offer an opinion regarding vibration testing. As such, contrary  
3 to Plaintiffs' assertion, Mr. Carnahan has opinions about vibration testing and the  
4 impropriety of Plaintiffs' expert's vibration testing (which Plaintiffs' expert admits to  
5 failing to follow manufacturer's instructions when using the accelerometer to measure  
6 vibrations).

7 **9. "No testing of the power cords from any of the three editions of the  
8 Subject Hair Dryer, and/or any opinions based thereon"**

9 Again, Plaintiffs are vague and ambiguous about what "three editions" of hair dryers  
10 they are claiming Mr. Carnahan should be excluded from opining about. Nevertheless, it  
11 is not a prerequisite that Conair's expert perform power cord testing before being permitted  
12 to provide an opinion about power cord testing, or critique Plaintiffs' expert's testing  
13 methodology or reliability of his conclusions.

14 In critiquing Plaintiffs' expert's testing, Exponent reviewed Plaintiffs' expert's  
15 metallographic examination, and made observations regarding the same. [Exhibit "A" at  
16 p. 64.] Further, Mr. Carnahan measured hardness of cord bushings from samples removed  
17 from the destructively tested hair dryers. [*Id.* ¶2.] Exponent also reviewed Plaintiffs'  
18 expert's FTIR analysis and graphed the results. [*Id.* at p. 70.] Carnahan has a foundation  
19 and basis for critiquing Plaintiffs' power cord testing having been present during testing,  
20 and having reviewed and analyzed 4x's test results. Accordingly, there is no basis to  
21 exclude Mr. Carnahan from providing an opinion about power cord testing.

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1       **V. CONCLUSION.**

2       Defendant Conair Corporation requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs' motion to  
3       exclude certain of Mr. Carnahan's opinions. If there is any question as to any of the  
4       opinions raised by Plaintiffs' motion, Conair requests that the Court hold a 402 hearing to  
5       address these issues.

6

7       DATED: August 8, 2016

Rosen ♦ Saba, LLP

8       By: s/ Ryan D. Saba

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## PROOF OF SERVICE

**STATE OF CALIFORNIA** )  
**COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES** )  
ss

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 9350 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 250, Beverly Hills, California 90212.

On August 8, 2016, I served the foregoing document described as:  
**DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE  
INADMISSIBLE, SPECULATIVE, UNFOUNDED EXPERT OPINION  
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S ENGINEERING EXPERT ROBERT A.  
CARNAHAN** on the interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof  
enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

**PLEASE SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST**

[ ] By Mail -

As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Beverly Hills, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

By electronic transmission to all parties at the recipients at the electronic address above by using the Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system.

[✓] FEDERAL I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made. I also declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the above is true and correct.

Executed on **August 8, 2016**, at Beverly Hills, California.

/s/ Ryan D. Saba  
Ryan D. Saba, Esq.

1  
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